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RECENT CASE NOTES
ABITRATON AND AwARD-FRST CONSTRUCTMN OF SECTION 3 OF NEW YoRx
ARKTrATION LAw.-The defendant and plaintiff, English and American corpora-
tions, made in New York a contract which provided for arbitration in that
state of all disputes arising out of the contract. The arbitration clause pro-
vided that "in default of either party appointing any arbitrator within one month
of the other party requesting it to do so, the latter shall name both arbitrators
and they shall elect an umpire" and together make an award. The defendant
refused to appoint an arbitrator to settle a dispute. The plaintiff thereupon,
pursuant to the contract, appointed an arbitration board which made an award.
The present action was brought in England on the award, which the defendant
claimed was not binding. The plaintiff relied upon section 2 of the New York
Arbitration Law of i92o. Construing section 3 of that Act, the court below held
for the defendant that the "party aggrieved by the . . . refusal of another to
perform under a contract .... providing for arbitration" must first obtain an
order from the court directing that the arbitration proceed in the manner pro-
vided for in the contract, which the plaintiff had not done. Held, in reversing
the judgment, that under section 2 of the New York statute the power of the
plaintiff to appoint an arbitration board was irrevocable and that the award
therefore was binding. Bankers & Shippers Insurance Co. of New York v.
Liverpool Marinw & General Insurance Co., Ltd. (1925, C. A.) N. Y. L. JouR.
March 4, 1925.
Whether the party willing to arbitrate must apply to the court for aid before
he can proceed to an award pursuant to the contract, if the arbitration agree-
ment provides also the remedy for refusal to arbitrate, has as yet not been
decided by a New York court. In holding it unnecessary, the present decision
gives agreements to arbitrate a legal sanction which makes them effective and
carries out the spirit of the Arbitration Act. See Cohen, The Law of Commer-
cial Arbitration and the New York Statute (1921) 31 YALE LA w JOURNAL, 147;
Sturges, Commercial Arbitration or Court Application of Common Law Rules
of Marketing? (1925) 34 ibid. 48o; cf. Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg (1921)
23o N. Y. 261, 13o N. E. 288. And in giving the same effect to an arbitration
statute which is given to other provisions of contract law in cases involving
the conflict of laws, it makes commercial treaties unnecessary for the operation
of such statutes in international commerce. See Wolfe, Arbitration that
"Sticks" (Oct. 13, 1924) 41 COMMERCE REPORTS, 67.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAWV-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ACT ImPOSING COMMON
CARRIER DUTIES ON TRUCKING BUSINESS.-A Michigan statute made all persons
engaged in the business of transporting persons or property by motor vehicle for
hire upon the public highways of the state "common carriers" and subject to
regulation as such. Mich. Pub. Acts, 1923, no. 209. One section of the act
provided for compulsory insurance by common carriers for the protection of
property carried by them. Plaintiff, the owner of trucks engaged solely in inter-
state transportation of automobile bodies under three contracts, obtained an
interlocutory injunction restraining the defendant commission from enforcing
the act against him on the ground that the imposition of such duties on him
burdened interstate commerce and violated the fourteenth amendment to the
federal constitution. Defendant appealed. Held, that the decree be affirmed.
Michigan Public Utilities Commission v. Duke Cartage Co. (Jan. 12, 1925) U.
S. Sup. Ct., Oct. Term, I924, No. 283.
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Persons engaged in a business involving the use of public highways, conducting
it solely by discriminate rather than indiscriminate special contracts, are not
common carriers. See Terminal Taxicab Co. v. District of Columbia (i91'6)
241 U, S. 252, 36 Sup. Ct. 583; see (923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 841. It is
submitted that the distinction is justified because of no public need for the
imposition of public service duties in a business such as the plaintiffs, as con-
trasted with a jitney business. See (i92i) 31 YALE LAiW JOURNAL, 183. Or
an ordinary trucking business. Collier v. Langan and Taylor Storage and Mov-
ing Co. (i9io) 147 Mo. App. 700, 127 S. W. 435. But a duty to insure as pro-
vided in the statute in the instant case might well be imposed on private as on
common carriers. See Marx, Compdsory Compensation InSurance (1925) 25
CoL L. REv. 164, 191.
CoNsnrrurioNAL LAW-ELETiONS--VALiDITY OF ABSENTEE-VoTING -Ar.-A
petition was presented to reject the absentee votes in the election of a councilman,
on the ground that the act of the legislature permitting absent voting was uncon-
stitutional. The lower court granted the petition. Held, that the judgment be
affirmed. In re Contested Election in Fifth Ward of Lancaster City (1924, Pa.)
126 Atl. I99.
The validity of legislation, permitting absentee voting for a state officer, depends
on the controlling provisions, of the state constitution. See Bourland v. Hildreth
(1864) 26 Calif. i6I, i8o; Twitchell v. Blodgett (1865) 13 Mich. 127, 149;
(1922) 31 YALx LAW JOURNAL, 326. But courts interpret differently like provi-
sions of their constitutions. See Jenkins v. Board of Elections (i92o) i8o N. C.
i69, io4 S. E. 346. The court in the instant case reasoned that the phrase "offer
to vote" required personal presence of voter; that constitutional provisions giving
one class, i. e. soldiers, the privilege of voting impliedly excluded all others; and
that the provision for secrecy would not be preserved if absentee voting was
allowed. As forty-three states have already adopted absentee voting laws in some
form, and as a fuller expression of public opinion at the ballot box seems desirable,
such legislation, unless palpably unreasonable or arbitrary, should be sustained.
See 14 A. L. R_ 1256, note.
CoNSTITuTIONAL LA--STATUTE TO DEAL WITH SiNaLE SUBJECT ExPmassE IN
Tr-E-CHosEs IN AcTioN BEYOND SCOPE OF SALES Acr.-The plaintiff sued on
the defendant's oral agreement to purchase certain shares of stock. The defendant
pleaded the Statute of Frauds (Uniform Sales Act, sec. 4). The State Constitu-
tion provided that no bill, except general appropriation bills, should be passed
containing more than one subject to be clearly expressed in the title. Pa. Const.
Art. IlI, sec. 3. The lower court gave judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff
appealed on the ground that since shares of corporate stock were choses in action
and since "choses in action" did not appear in the title of the Sales Act, sec. 4
was unconstitutional in so far as it applied to choses in action. Held, that the
judgment be reversed. Guppy v. Moltrap (1924, Pa.) i26 At. 766.
Sec. 76 of the Sales Act states that the context of the Act might require
"goods" to include "choses in action." And sec. 4 (3) has been in effect so
construed. Davis Laundry ( Cleaning Co. v. Whitmore (1915) 92 Ohio St. 44,
nio N. E. 5i8; but cf. Smith v. Lingelbach (1922) 177 Wis. 170, 187 N. W. 1oo7
(shares of corporate stock not "goods" within meaning of sec. 76). The stringent
mode of construction adopted by the court might with equal justice be made to
effect the nullification of all provisions of the Sales Act relating merely to
contracts to sell rather than "sales." As no evils are likely to be incurred, it
seems desirable to avoid a narrow construction of these terms with respect to the
problem herein involved. Cf. generally i Sutherland, Statutory Construction (2d
ed. I9O4) secs. iii, I, i27; Rose, Titles of Statutes (1883) 1[7 Am. L: Rv. 495;
(1922) 22 COL. L. RFv. 484.
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CONTRACrS-EFFECT OF PowEa To CANcE-The plaintiff promised to manu-
facture collision mats for the Navy Department of the United States which
agreed to pay a certain price and to supply the required canvas. Before the
time for supplying the canvas had expired, the armistice was signed and soon
after the Navy Department suggested that the plaintiff stop operations. The
plaintiff had made some preliminary preparations. After a partial settlement,
the plaintiff sued claiming further amounts. The contract was made pursuant
to the Act of June 15, 1917 (46 Stat. at L. 182) which gave the United States
an unconditional power of cancellation, although apparently unknown to either
party. The Court of Claims refused to award prospective profits to the plain-
tiff. Held, that in view of the Government's power to cancel, the judgment be
affirmed. College Point Boat Corp. v. United States (Jan. i, 1925) U. S. Sup.
Ct, Oct. Term, 1924, no. 121.
A void promise is insufficient consideration to support a counter promise.
Shaver v. Bear River Co. (1858) io Calif. 396 (the promise of a married woman
under disability to contract); see i Williston, Contracts (192o) 207, note 48.
In these cases there is no inquiry whether the party receiving the void promise
knew of the facts making it void. Meyer v. Haworth (1838) 8 A. & E. 467;
see i Williston, Contracts (192o) 2o7. An illusory promise is likewise insuffi-
cient consideration; as where one party reserves an unqualified power to cancel.
Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Orange Crusr Co. (1924, C. C. A. 5th) 296
Fed. 693; see i Williston, Contracts (192o) 73, note 7, 219-22o. The same rule
has, peculiarly enough, been applied to a power in either party to cancel "for
just cause." Oakland Motor Car Co. v. Indiana Automobile Co. (1912, C. C.
A. 7th) 2Ol Fed. 499. But legal consequences may arise from such promises.
The supposed contract may amount to an offer to one party acceptable before
revocation. Great. Northern Ry. v. Witham (1873) L. R., 9 C. P. x6. So, in
the instant case the preliminary negotiations may be regarded as an offer which
the Government could have accepted by sending canvas. Contractual rights
have been regarded as created by mere lapse of a stipulated time. Gile v. Inter-
State Motor Car Co. (1914) 27 N. D. io8, 145 N. W. 732; see (1914) 12 MIcI.
L. REv. 677, and (1914) 62 PA. L. REv. 633. Preliminary negotiations have been
considered as neither a contract nor an offer but an agreement silently incor-
porated into all subsequent dealings. See Willard, Sutherland & Co. v. United
States (1923) 262 U. S. 489. Of this type are most contracts of employment
between an employer and a union, acquiring legal force only when individual
contracts of employment are made with reference to them. Hudson v. Cincin-
nati, N. L & T. P. Ry. (1913) 152 Ky. 711, 154 S. W. 47. Similar fixed terms
for possible future contracts are finding growing favor in business, e.g., the
bankers' regulations regarding documents of title. See i Williston, Sales (2d
ed. 1924) 624; cf. Wenger & Co. v. Proffer Silk Hosiery Mills (1925) 239 N. Y.
199, 146 N. E. 203. "Agreement" and "contracet" thus seem to be turning into
widely different conceptions. Such growth of business practices supplementing
and ultimately becoming law is a continuous process. See Commons, Law and
Economics (1925) 34 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 371. In general, the same rules of
contract law are applied where the United States is a party as in contracts
between private persons. See United States v. Bentley & Sons Co. (1923, S.
D. Ohio) 293 Fed. 229; see Grismore, Contracts With the United States (1924)
22 MIcE. L. REv. 749. There is no reason to quarrel with the instant decision,
since the lapse of time had not resulted in uncompensated outlays by the plain-
tiff and no fixed orders had been stipulated for periods already elapsed.
CONTRACrs-SUIT FOR PART OF RENT DuE BARS SUBSEQUENT ACTION FOR
BALANcE.-Upon a breach of contract to pay rent monthly in advance, the
plaintiff on June 22 sued for rent due. On August 7, when the July and August
rent was due, the plaintiff sued for and recovered only the July rent. Upon
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leave, the plaintiff then amended his first complaint tt include the August rent.
The trial court allowed judgment for the June rent and refused to allow for
the August rent and the plaintiff appealed. Held, that the judgment be
affirmed. Hare v. Winfree (1924, Wash.). 22g Pac. 16.
To avoid harassing courts and defendants by -a multiplicity of suits, a single
cause of action cannot be split to furnish the bases for several suits. Roy v.
Scales (92) 76 Ind. App. 373, 132 N. E. 268; Klinkert v. Streissguth (1923)
155 Minn. 388, 193 N. W. 687; see (1922) 32 YAIE LAw JouRNAL, 190; Clark,
The Code Cause of Action (1924) 33 YAE LA.w JouRNAL, 817. But see
McLaughlin v. Levenbaum (1924, Mass.) 142. N. E. 9o6. So, where rent is pay-
able at stated times, separate actions may be brought for each installment as
it falls due. Marshall v. Grasse Clothing Co. (igoo) 184 Ill. 42i, 56 N. E. 807.
But all installments due and unpaid when one action is brought must be included
in that action. Burritt v. Belfy (1879) 47 Conn. 323; See v. See (1922) 294 Mo.
495, 242 S. W. 949; 24 A. L. R. 885, note. See Matheny v. Preston Hotel Co.
(1918) 14o Tenn. 41, 203 S. W. 327; Kennedy v. New York (19o9) 196 N. Y.-
19, 89 N. E. 36o. Lower New York courts have drawn exceptions to this
general rule where special circumstances appeared to take the case outside the
policy upon which the rule was founded. Kieley v. Kahn (19o6, Sup. Ct. App.
T.) 5o Misc. 309, 98 N. Y. Supp. 774 (second suit for subsequent rent started
during pendency of first; recovery in second no bar to first); Petersen v.
Claire (1922, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 11S Misc. 85, 193 N. Y. Supp. 543 (first suit
did not include all necessary parties) ; Van Damn v. Penrose (1923, Sup. Ct.
App. T.) 120 Misc. III, 197 N. Y. Supp. 513 (defendant avoided summons on
first action until another month's rent was due). In the instant case, the coin-
cidence that the plaintiff had a suit pending and thus was enabled to include his
action for the August rent by an amended complaint seems an insufficient
reason for excepting this plaintiff from the penalty usually imposed for the
benefit of the defendant for similar failures to sue for all due installments.
See Claflin & Kimball v. Mather Electric Co. (1899, C. C. A. 2d) 98 Fed. 699.
The hardship involved in the value of the general rule is only another reason
for making few exceptions thereto. Petersen v. Claire, supra; Burritt v. BeIfy,
supra.
CRI mINAL LAw-CoNspIRAcY-AFFEcT oF OVERT AcTs oNv VENUL.-The defen-
dants were indicted in Oneida County for a conspiracy to defraud by means of
false reports mailed in New York County and received in Oneida County. A
statute required an illegal agreement and an overt act in pursuance thereof to con-
vict for the crime of conspiracy. N. Y. Penal Laws, i9og, sec. 583. The defen-
dants demurred on the ground that the crime was not within the jurisdiction of
the County Court of Oneida County. Held, that the demurrer be 6verruled.
People v. Levy (1924, Oneida County Ct.) 123 Misc, 228, 206 N. Y. Supp. 857.
A number of states have enacted statutes similar to that in the instant case,
requiring for the crime of conspiracy the agreement and an overt act. 3 Bishop,
New Criminal Procedure (2d ed. 1913) sec. 202; U. S'. Rev. Sts. 1878, sec. 544o.
Under such statutes a conviction in either jurisdiction has been sustained.
Benson v. Henkel (i9o5) 198 U. S. I, 25 Sup. Ct. 569; Hyde v. Shine (19o4)
igg U. S. 62, 25 Sup. Ct. 760. In the absence of statute the crime of conspiracy
is complete when the agreement is made. Commonwealth v. McHale (188) 97
Pa. 397; Commonwealth v. Fuller (1882) 132 Mass. 563. Yet even then the
venue may be laid in any jurisdiction where either the agreement is made or where
any act is committed in furtherance of the common design. King v. Brisac
(18o3, K. B.) 4 East, *164; Territory of Hawaii v. Goto (1923) 27 Haw. 65;
People v. Blummnberg (1915) 271 IlL i8o, iio N. E. 788; Noyes v. State (879)
41 N, 3. L. 418; 1 Wharton, Criminal Law (ilth ed. 1912) sec. 333; 3 Bishop,
op. cit. sec. 236.
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INSURANcE-ExPL SION CAUSED BY FIRE IN NEIGHBORING BUILDI G NOT
WITHIN FImE INSURANCE Poticy.-The plaintiff's building was insured against
fire, the policy providing that the company would not be liable for explosion of
any kind "unless fire ensues, and in that event for the damage by fire only."
Fire in a neighboring building caused an explosion therein which materially
damaged the plaintiff's building in addition to the slight damage caused by sparks
from the fire. In a suit on the policy the lower court denied recovery for the
material damage. Held, that the judgment be affirmed. Exchange Bank of
Novinger v. Iowa State Insurance Co. (1924, Iowa) 265 S. W. 855.
Even where the policy carries an express exemption, as in the instant case,
recovery is allowed when the explosion occurs on the insured premises as a direct
result of a "hostile fire." Wheeler v. Phenix Insurance Co. (1911) 203 N. Y.
283, 96 N, E. 452; Western Insurance Co. v. Skrs (igi ) 64 Colo. 342, 17iX
Pac. 358; 4 Cooley, Briefs on the Law of Insurance (1905) 3027. If the word-
ing is ambiguous the court construes the policy most favorably to the insured.
Boon v. Aetna Insurance Co. (1874) 40 Conn. 575; 3 Joyce, Insurance (1897)
sec. 2592; Beal, Cardinal Rules of Legal Interpretation (3d ed. 1924) 144, 24o.
The proximity of the cause in such case is held to bring the loss within the con-
templation of the parties. On the facts of the instant case the law of torts
would doubtless consider the cause sufficiently proximate to impose responsi-
bility on the negligent or wilful instigator of the fire. Cf. Milwaukee and St.
Paul Ry. v. Kellogg (1876) 94 U. S. 469; Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. v. McBride
(1894) 54 Kan. 172, 37 Pac. 978; 3 Shearman & Redfield, Law of Negligence
(6th ed. 1913) sec. 666; contra: Ryan v. N. Y. Central R. R. (1866) 35 N. Y.
21o. But in construing insurance contracts the question is whether the loss
suffered was within the contemplation of the contracting parties.
PRoCEss-PaRsoNAL SERvicE-ORAL ACCEPTANCE BY DEFENDANT ON DELIvERY
TO HUSBAND IxoPERATrv.m-A process server went to the home of the defendant
for the purpose of making "personal service" of a summons on her. The defen-
dant, from a room adjoining that in which her husband and the process server
were, accepted the service orally, and directed that a copy of the summons be left
with her husband. The lower court refused to set aside a default judgment
entered on her failure to appear, and the defendant appealed on the grounds that
there had been no "personal service." Held, that the motion to set judgment
aside be granted. Ives v. Darling (1924, 3d Dept.) 2o6 N. Y. Supp. 493.
Usually in the absence of statutory provision, an agent may not accept service.
Davidson v. Clark (1887) 7 Mont. 100, 14 Pac. 663; Odessa Loan Ass'n. v. Dyer
(1911, Del.) 2 Boyce, 457, 81 Atl. 469; but cf. Williams & Pearson v. Ditten-
hoefer (19o4) 188 Mo. 134, 86 S. W. 242 (corporation). But where the person
accepting service acts not as an agent but in the nature of an "automaton" the
service is valid. Woodley v. Jordan (19o) 112 Ga. 151, 37 S. E. 178; Krotter
& Co. v. Norton (igog) 84 Neb. 137, 12o N. W. 923; I Mechem, Agency (1914)
sec. 1462; but see Ambrose v. Barber (1913) 13 Ga. App. 788, 79 S. E. 1135. A
defect in the service of process will not deprive the court of jurisdiction if there
is a general appearance or a plea to the merits. Grahm v. Wallace (igo) 206
Mass. 39, 91 N. E. lOO2. Or an acceptance or acknowledgment. Carter v. Penn
(1888) 79 Ga. 747, 4 S. E. 896 (written); Chapman v. Allen (1839, Iowa)
Morris, 32 (oral); Johnson v. Johnson. (1874) 52 Ga. 449 (conduct); I Kerr,
Pleading & Practice in the Western States (1919) see. 250 et seq.; contra:
Montgomery v. Tutt (1858) II Calif. 307 (oral), The instant case appears to be
unduly strict since it seems as if valid service could be found either on the grounds
of acceptance or of actual delivery to the defendant through her husband as an
"automaton." The decision seems unfortunate in that it fails to recognize that the
chief purpose of "personal service" is actual notice. See Hiller v. B. & M. )?y.
(1877) 70 N. Y. 223, 227.
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REAL PROPERTY-RiGHIT OF WARRANTOR OF TITLE TO QuiET TITL--The plain-
tiff, owner of land in fee, brought a bill to quiet title against the defendant,
holder of a trust deed to the land, under a statute permitting such action by
"any person against another who claims an estate or interest in real property
adverse to him." Before the case came to trial, plaintiff conveyed the land to
X, warranting the title. The defendant moved for judgment dismissing the
action, or for a nonsuit on the ground that having conveyed the land pendente
lite, the plaintiff had no interest therein to which defendant's claim was adverse.
The motion was denied, and judgment entered for the plaintiff. The defendant
excepted. Held, that the judgment be affirmed. Plotkin v. Merchant's Bank
and Trust Co. (1924, N. C.) 125 S. E. 541.
Under statutes similar to that in the instant case, and to some extent in equity
courts in the absence of statute, any interest which has to do with the present
or contingent enjoyment of land is sufficient to support a bill to remove cloud on
title. German-American, Savings Bank v. Gollner (igog) 155 Calif. 683, lO2
Pac. 932 (estate for years); Dudley v. Brornzing (1916) 79 W. Va. 331, 90
S. E. 878 (vendor's lien). But equity generally considers a "pecuniary" as
well as a "proprietary" interest a ground for relief. See International News
Service v. Associated Press (IgI8) 248 U. S. 215, 39 Sup. Ct. 68; Pound,
Equitable Relief against Defamation and Injuries to Personality (1916) 29
HARV. L. REv. 640. So, courts have held a "pecuniary interest" sufficient to
enable a plaintiff to bring a bill to remove cloud on title. I. re Phillips (1875)
6o N. Y. 16; Pier v. Fond du Lac County (1881) 53 Wis. 421, 1O N. W. 686.
Thus a vendor retaining the legal title as security for the purchase price is a
proper plaintiff. Heppenstall v. Leng (1907) 217 Pa. 491, 66 At. 991. As is
one who retains legal title and gives a bond for title. Coel v. Glos (1907) 232
Ill. 142, 83 N. E. 529; see Langlois v. Stewart (1895) i56 Ill. 6o9, 41 N. E. 177.
And a sufficient "pecuniary" interest is shown by a vendor whose vendee
refuses to complete payment of the purchase price because of the cloud. City
of Hartford v. Chipman (1852) 21 Conn. 488; Styer v. Sprague (1896) 63
Minn. 414, 65 N. W. 659. Or refuses to sue. Sutliff v. S1iittL (1897) 58 Kan.
559, 50 Pac. 455. Or whose inertia will result in loss of evidence or the per-
fecting of an adverse title. Jackson v. Kittle (1890) 34 W. Va. 207, 12" S. E.
484. A mere warrantor of title has no interest in the present or contingent
enjoyment of*the land, and the cases denying him the right to maintain a bill to
remove a cloud from the title do so on the ground that he has not a "property
right." Chaptnan v. Jones (1897) 149 Ind. 434, 47 N. E. Io65; Glos v. Goodrich
(1898) 175 Ill. 20, 5i N. E. 643. But the contingent risk of loss from the pos-
sible defect in the title, even without present damage, would seem a sufficient
"pecuniary" interest to support such a bill. Rener v. Mackay (1888,,C. C. N. D.
Ill.) 35 Fed. 86; Iones v. Nixon (1899) i02 Tenn. 95, 50 S. W. 740; Jackson
Milling Co. v. Scott (1907) 130 Wis. 267, ilo N. W. 184; contra: Bissell v.
Kellogg (1871, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 6o Barb. 617. The court took a laudable point
of view in refusing to dismiss the action because the plaintiff's interest had
changed from a "proprietary" to a "pecuniary" one pendente lite, since the
gravamen of the action, defendant's claim, and the relief proper to be given,
remained unchanged. Begole v. Hershey (i89i) 86 Mich. 130, 48 N. W. 790;
see Clark and Hutchins, The Real Party in Interest (925) 34 YALE LAw
JOURNAL, 256, at p. 269.
SALEs-REFusAL TO PAY DRAFT ON ONE GaouND AS A WAIVER OF ALL OTERS.-
The defendant drawee refused payment of a draft on the ground that the goods
for which the draft had been-drawn were not shipped within the time specified.
By agreement, the goods were sold and the proceeds applied to the purchase
price and suit was brought for the difference. The trial court admitted evi-
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dence that the plaintiff was not a bona fide holder of the draft. The plaintiff
brought a writ of error. Held, that the evidence should have been excluded,
since having based its refusal on one ground, the defendant could not defend on
another ground. Bank of Taiwan v. Union Nat. Bank (1924, C. C. A. 3d) I
Fed.: (2d) 65.
The instant case represents a strict application of a rigid rule. It is not
without support. Harvard v. Himmelein (1924, Mich.) 198 N. W. 207; Hones-
dale Ice Co. v. Lake Lodore Co. (1911) 232 Pa. 293, S& Atl. 3o6. But there
seems to be a general tendency against requiring a litigant to elect at his peril.
Leavenworth L. & H. Co. v. Waller (19o2) 65 Kan. 514, 7o Pac. 365 (not
required to elect between two inconsistent defenses, but may set up both);
Kaufman v. Cooper (199o) 39 Mont. 146, ioi Pac. 969 (mistake in election of
remedies did not waive the right to proper relief). Thus it has been held that
the setting up of one defense does not necessarily imply the absence of any
others. Woldert Grocery Co. v. Pillman (9rs) 191 Mo. App. 15, 176 S. W.
457; see List v. Chase (igo9) 8o Ohio St. 42, 88 N. E. 12o. And where the
plaintiff will not be unfairly prejudiced, it seems that the defendant should be
allowed to set up a defense not previously asserted. Young v. Rocher (1923,
Calif. App.) = Pac. 861 (objection could not have been obviated); Union
Brokerage Co. v. BeallBros. (1923) 3o Ga. App. 748, 119 S. E. 533 (no hard-
.ship caused plaintiff) ; Bates v. Cashman (1918) 23o Mass. 167, 119 N. E. 663;
Parkins v. Mo. Pac. Ry. (i9o6) 76 Neb. 242, io7 N. W. 26o. As in code plead-
ing, notice of the adversary's position might be considered an element of fair-
ness. Whittier, Notice Pleading (1918) 31 HARv. L. REv. 501. Thus it would
seem unfair if the allowance of an objection not previously disclosed should
prevent a plaintiff from putting in rebutting evidence which he had permitted
to escape. Although some courts have said that the defendant never waives an
objection of which he had no knowledge at the time of refusal. Fowler v.
Cobb (1921, Mo. App.) 232 S. W. 1084; Cooperage Co. v. Scofield (19O2, C. C. A.
8th) 115 Fed. iig. The rule under discussion has become practically limited to
commercial, and particularly sales, cases. Cf. 2 Williston, Contracts (192o)
secs. 743, 744; 2 Williston, Sales (2d ed. I924) sec. 495. New York, long a
stronghold for the rigid rule, has recently adopted more liberal views. Cawley
v. Weiner (1923) 236 N. Y. 357, 14o N. E. 724; see Strasbourger v. Leerburger
(1922) 233 N. Y. 55, 134 N. E. 834. The decision in the instant case seems
inconsistent with the language used by the same court in Second Nat. Bank v.
Lash Corp. (1924, C. C. A. 3d) 299 Fed. 371. The rigid rule adopted in the
instant case seems urifortunate in that it tends to curtail settlements out of
court, since it puts a -premium on not explaining a refusal to perform a contract.
TRUSTS--APPoRTIONMENT OF "ROYALTY" ON PuBmcIcAIoN BETWEEN LIFE BENE-
FIC-ARY AND REMAINDERAN.-By devise the testator created a trust estate,
directing that the income therefrom be paid to certain life beneficiaries, with the
remainder elsewhere. Among the assets of the trust estate was the right to
"royalties" from a certain publication. The trustee seeks direction from the
court as to who is entitled to the "royalties." The lower court directed that they
be credited to the principal and held for the remaindermen. An appeal was
taken. Held, that the "royalties" be apportioned between the life beneficiary and
the remaindermen. It re Elster's Will (1924, 4th Dept.) 206 N. Y. Supp. 765.
This case presents another aspect of the troublesome question as to the line
of distinction between principal and income. See Clark, Eisner v. Macomber and
Some Income Tax Problems (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 735; CoimENrs
S(1924) 34 ibid. 195. "Royalty" in a mining lease is usually regarded in the
nature of "rent" and disposed of as "income," although obviously the right to
the "royalty" becomes of less value as the mine decreases in value with the con-
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tinual output. Campbell v. Wardlaw (1883, H. L.) L. R. 8 A. C. 641; Sauls-
berry v. Saulsberry (1915) 162 Ky. 486, 172 S. W. 932; 36 L. R. A. (N. s.)
i1o5, note. But the instant case holds that this decrease in the value of the
right to "royalty" in the case of a publication is so great that the "royalty" par-
takes both of the nature of principal and income, although manifestly circum-
stances other than the yielding of the "income" produce the decrease. For an
opposite conclusion, see Davidson v. Ogilvie (191o) 47 Sc. L. Rep. 248;
Copinger, Copyright (5th ed. 1915) 552.
TRuSTS-CONsTRUcTIVE TRusT OF LAND AcQuiRED UPON ORAL AGREEMENT TO
REcONvEy.-In reliance upon the defendant's oral agreement to execute a new
mortgage, the plaintiff discharged a previous mortgage which he held on the
defendant's farm, leaving the defendant the sole record owner. The defendant
repudiated his once honest agreement, selling the farm to X. In a suit to
establish a constructive trust in the land, and to recover from the defendant
the sum received for the plaintiff's interest therein, the lower court found for
the plaintiff, although the defendant pleaded the statute of frauds. Held, that
the judgment be affirmed. Miller v. Belville (1924, Vt.) 126 AtI. 590.
A reconveyance by a grantee of land acquired on an oral agreement to hold
in trust for the grantor, or to reconvey on demand, is generally not compelled
because of the statute of frauds. Patton v. Beecher (1878) 62 Ala. 579; contra:
Davies v. Otty (1865, Ch.) 35 Beav. 208; Haigh v. Kaye (1872) L. R. 7 Ch.
App. 469 (England using the statute of frauds "to prevent fraud, not to foster
it"). The court compels a reconveyance, however, by calling the grantee's hold-
ing of the land a constructive trust, an express exception from the operation of
the statute of frauds, where the grantee's promise was fraudulent when made.
Brown v. Doane (189o) 86 Ga. 32, 12 S. E. 179. Or where "confidential rela-
tions" exist between the grantor and grantee. Cooney v. Glynn (191o) 157
Calif. 583, io8 Pac. 5o6. And where one devises land to another upon the
latter's prior oral agreement'to convey to a third party. Caldwell v. Caldwell
(1871, Ky.) 7 Bush, 515. A few American cases hold that the grantee's "refusal
to perform his promise amounts to a constructive fraud" on which the court
will create a constructive trust in favor of the grantor. O'Day v. Annex
Realty Co. (1917, MO.) 191 S. W. 41; Hatcher v. Hatcher (1919) 264 Pa. lO5,
lO7 Atl. 66o; Faville v. Robinson (1921) iii Tex. 48, 227 S. W. 938. Land
acquired in consideration of an oral agreement, thereafter broken, to exchange
parcels of land, must'be reconveyed to prevent the unjust enrichment of the
grantee, although the oral agreement cannot be enforced. Deming v. Lee (1911)
174 Ala. 410, 56 So. 921. And where the vendor of land, after receiving money
under an oral agreement to convey, refuses to perform, the vendee, although
unable to enforce the contract, can recover the money in quasi-contract. Payne
v. Hackney (i9oi) 84 Minn. 195, 87 N. W. 6o8. And the plaintiff can compel
the reconveyance of land conveyed with an oral understanding that it was merely
security for a loan, in the nature of a mortgage. Campbell v. Dearborn (1872)
1O9 Mass. 130. In view of these analogies it would seem that a constructive
trust could be predicated on the unjust enrichment of the grantee, obviating the
need of fraud other than the breach of the oral agreement, or the need of
resorting to the "exceptions" developed by the American courts in order to
avoid the statute of frauds and "get at" the grantee. Scott, Conveyances on
Trusts not Properly Declared (1924) 37 HARV. L. Rxv. 653, 656, et seq. And this
does not violate the statute of frauds, for in spite of the similarity in result, the
enforcement of a constructive trust predicated upon the unjust enrichment of
the grantee is not an enforcement of the express oral trust or agreement. It is
a "purely accidental coincidence" that the relief happens to be the same. Ames,
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Oral Trusts of Land (19o7) 20 HAv. L. REv. 549, 551, et seq.; COMMENTS
(1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 389. See Westphal v. Heckizalt (igi6) 185
Ind. 88, 97, 113 N. E. 299.
VERDICTs-AccEPA.NCE BY CLERI-REJECTION OF IMPROPER VERDIC.-In a civil
suit the judge by authority of statute left the clerk to take the verdict. The
jury reported: 'We find the defendant guilty and fine him $i,ooo." After
twice remanding the jury with instructions as to a proper verdict the clerk
accepted this: "We find for the plaintiff $2,5o0." A new trial was granted on
the grounds that the first verdict was a nullity and that the clerk had authority
only to accept it as rendered. Folkner v. Hopkins (1924, N. J. L.) 126 At.
633.
In the absence of statutory authority a judicial function performed by a clerk
is usually void. Scale Co. v. Friedman. (19o9) 79 N. J. L. 214, 74 Atl. 27o.
But his receipt of a civil verdict in the absence of the judge is a defect which
may be waived. Dubuc v. Lazell Co. (igo5) 182 N. Y. 482, 75 N. E. 4O (by
stipulation); Nelson v. Wood (914, C. C. A. 3d) 21o Fed. i (by laches);
(191o) 16 Ann. Cas. go, note; but see Kelly v. Western Ry. (1911) 46 Ind. App.
697, 699, 93 N. E. 616, 617. In New Jersey the practice is authorized by statute.
3 N. J. Comp. Sts. 1911, p. 4103. A court may remand a jury with instructions
to reform an improper verdict. Morley v. Wilson (1921) lO9 Kan. 603, 2Ol
Pac. 81. Or reform it in open court with the approval of the jury. Mackay
Co. v. Armstrong (1922, Tex. Civ. App.) 241 S. W. 795. Or after the jury
is discharged reform it so as to change form but not substance. Minot v.
Boston (19o9) 2O Mass. io, 86 N. E. 783. What is form and what is substance
is a question of 'fact in each case. A verdict is to be upheld if possible by
liberal construction. Hubbard S. S. Co. v. Crescio (1913) 179 Ill. App. 56
(verdict in tort language held to sustain judgment in contract action). This
doctrine might well have been extended to obviate the expense and delay of a
new trial in the instant case. The result reached is surely diametrically opposed
to the time-saving intent of the framers of the statute.
WrLLs-ATTEsTATIoN-NEcESSITY THAT WITNESSES SEE TESTATOR'S SIGNA-
TtJRE.-A will was so folded when the witnesses signed that they could not see
the testatrix's signature. A judgment denying probate was affirmed and pro-
ponents appealed. Held, that it was error to deny probate on this ground.
Thornton v. Herndon (1924, Ill.) 145 N. E. 6o3; contra: In re Crill's Estate
(1924, Surro. Ct.) 124 Misc. 134, 2o7 N. Y. Supp. 775.
The English Wills Act, followed by the statutes of New York and other
states, requires the testator's signature to be made or acknowledged in the
presence of the attesting witnesses, necessarily implying that the signature must
be in sight when the witnesses sign. In re Sage's Will (1919, Prerog. Ct.) 90
N. J. Eq. 2o9, 1O7 Atl. 151; Matter of Pierce (192o, Surro. Ct) 113 Misc. 311,
184 N. Y. Supp. 536; (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 847. But in those states
whose acts follow the Statute of Frauds the statutory provision is that the will
shall be attested and subscribed by the witnesses. I Schouler, Wills, Executors,
and Administrators (6th ed. 1923) see. 527. Some of these states construe this
provision also to require that the testator's signature be at least acknowledged
to the witnesses and that it be visible. Hawkes v. Hawkes (igis) 23o Mass.
ii, iig N. E. 122; Albert v. Stafford (1918) 123 Va. 338, 96 S, E. 761; (1914)
2 VA. L. REv. 228. Others, holding an acknowledgment of the will rather than
of the signature necessary, do not require the signature to be visible. Gould
v. Seminary (9o) 189 Ill. 282, 59 N. E. 536; In re Dougherty's Estate (1912)
168 Mich. 281, 134 N. W. 24; (1921) 4 ILL. L. QUART. 62. In any case the
failure of a witness to notice an apparently visible signature will not invalidate
the will. Coleman v. Lindley (1924) 115 Kan. 8o2, 224 Pac. 912.
